To my grandfather, who lies in the French section of the military cemetery in Warsaw
DANIEL NICOLAS FOUBERT
Geo-economist and founder of Excalibur Insight, a Warsaw-based international business consulting and analysis firm.
Introduction
Economically, President Macron’s France is doing well. Politically, the situation is different. This is not at all surprising if one observes the increasing primacy of the economy over all other human affairs for nearly two millennia. What is more worrying is the geostrategic vacuity of a country that prides itself on being a great diplomatic power. France, in fact, seems to ignore two recent facts: the reunification of Germany and the emergence of an independent Central Europe.
It continues to act as if it did not need a financially healthy counterweight to Germany within the European Union, as if the Franco-German couple with France as junior partner could in many cases be self-sufficient, as if Russia were still a major political and economic power that could help France in its quest for independence from the United States, and as if Central Europe were a political desert.
Worse than that, its view of the world remains too often riveted in a realpolitik proceeding from the old European empires (we know where this led Germany and we see where it leads Russia today). As a result, France sees a multipolar world where the Anglo-Saxons see a liberal international order and struggles to adapt to it.
The most bitter failures of French foreign policy over the last thirty years are to be found in Europe: the disaster of the policy of trying (relentlessly) to make Russia a partner and the detestable relations that France has with a number of European Union countries in Central Europe. This does not create the right conditions either for strategic autonomy, or for European power, or for any continuation of European construction.
The French geostrategic tradition in Central Europe
Let us now recall some neglected elements of the French geostrategic tradition, because these problems are also consubstantial with a vast memory lapse.
Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, France’s main ally to the east of what was then Germany was Poland. Relations with the Grand Duchy of Muscovy, apart from some occasional alliances, were disastrous. This was for two reasons:
- The eternal anti-Prussian and anti-Austrian interests of the French monarchy, to which the Republic of Two Nations (Poland-Lithuania) was the preferred remedy (Catherine II was a German, let’s not forget).
- The cultural, economic, political and social backwardness of Russia.
The 19th century was not much brighter politically for Franco-Russian relations, between the ephemeral Treaty of Tilsit and the Crimean War. The brutal repression of Polish uprisings by Tsarist Russia as well as the deportation of the Polish elite to Siberia led to French support for the Polish cause and to the recurrent deterioration of Franco-Russian relations.
France still maintained strong ties with Poland, despite the disappearance of the latter from the map of Europe. The Napoleonic era gave some examples of this, through the creation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and even the fact that Polish troops constituted the best cavalry of the empire – the charge of Polish uhlans during the battle of Somosierra is among its most brilliant feats of arms. In addition, Polish political and cultural emigration systematically chose Paris as its residence. The Père Lachaise cemetery has about 600 Polish graves, including that of Frédéric Chopin, who is perhaps the best representative of Franco-Polish friendship.
Faced with the Francophilia of the Polish elite, Russia’s solution was a strategy of undermining. The Russian elite on the one hand learned French, on the other hand deported and massacred the Polish elite, just as the cuckoo throws away the egg contained in the nest it takes. This strategy successfully led to the agreement of 1891.
France, however, found it difficult to be deceived. Let us observe that there are several kinds of allies, as there are several kinds of enemies. There are allies of circumstance, such as Russia, whose alliances with France have always been fragile and even constrained, and there are natural allies, which, like Poland, endure despite disasters, like the constants of geography (“Great Britain is an island surrounded by water on all sides”…).
To measure the capital importance of the Franco-Polish alliance and of Central Europe in general in our national strategic thinking, let us return to the sources of French geostrategy in the 20th century, expressed in the words of none other than General De Gaulle. In 1919, De Gaulle gave a conference in Warsaw entitled “The Franco-Polish Alliance”, the text of which is as forgotten as it is formidable for “Russian-German” interests (because that is how he saw it). For De Gaulle, it was impossible to dissociate the German problem from the Russian problem: he considered Germany and Russia as natural allies. This natural alliance of Russia and Germany, he saw the keystone in their common interest in oppressing the other nations of Central Europe. Learning from the great mistake of Napoleon III, the man who was then only Captain De Gaulle – but who already did not need a position of power to be right – saw that the joint domination of Germany and Russia over Central Europe constituted a danger of the first order for France, because it conferred on Germany proportions that could only lead to the domination of the continent, putting France at its mercy. To dominate the heart of the European continent – its heartland – is to dominate Europe. De Gaulle did not want this for Germany in 1919, never wanted it until his death, and certainly would not want it today.
The importance of this text – as much as the size of our memory lapse – is such that it cannot be quoted other than unsparingly:
“In France [of the eighteenth century] as in France of all time, the party was many of the politicians who refused, by system, any intervention outside the borders. It was the influence of this party which in the 18th century caused us to lose Canada and the Indies, and which caused us to refuse to give any serious help to dying Poland. […] France has paid a heavy price for her negligence towards Poland. She knows today how much it cost her to have let Berlin and Vienna destroy this natural counterweight to Germanism between Central and Eastern Europe.”
“We want a strong Poland, first of all because it is the solution of justice. This state was powerful at the time when the rapacity of its neighbours dismembered it, and its power, in short, was used only against the enemies of European civilization, thus deserving to keep it. And then, it is our most obvious national interest that the Polish force be formidable. Germany is beaten. But it is already recovering as the armies of our Anglo-Saxon allies move away from the Rhine. Besides, everything must be foreseen: who guarantees us the eternal and above all immediately effective alliance of England and America? In order to keep an eye on Germany, slyly determined to take revenge, to impose it on her and, if necessary, to reduce her once again, we need a continental ally on whom we can count at all times. Poland will be that ally. Every step forward of Germanism to the West is a threat to her, every Prussian advantage gained to the East is a danger to us.”
“Bolshevism will not last forever in Russia. A day will come, it is fatal, when order will be restored there and Russia, reconstituting her forces, will look around her again. On that day, she will see herself as peace will leave her, that is to say, deprived of Estonia, Livonia, Courland, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Bessarabia, perhaps Ukraine, reduced in a word to the limits of old Muscovy. Will she be satisfied with this? We do not believe so. The same causes producing the same effects, we will see Russia resume its march towards the West and the Southwest […]. On which side will Russia look for help to resume the work of Peter the Great and Catherine II? Let us not say it too loudly, but let us know and think about it: it is on the side of Germany that she will inevitably turn her hopes.”
“I will consider myself very happy, if I can strengthen in your mind the conviction that by serving here, we serve par excellence a national interest. [Each of our efforts in Poland, gentlemen, is a little more glory for eternal France.”
A century later, this text resonates strangely with current events.
Here is the logic of French policy in Central Europe as deduced from the Treaty of Versailles. This treaty, later reinforced by the Franco-Polish alliance of 1921, guaranteed France’s security, just like the treaties of Westphalia in the seventeenth century (that unfortunate humiliation of the Habsburgs caused by the dangerous Richelieu and the deceitful Mazarin…). France provided political and military support to Poland, and Poland guaranteed juicy economic concessions in exchange, in a system comparable to the petrodollar.
This system, unfortunately, collapsed when France signed the Locarno treaties in 1925, due to its lack of resistance to Anglo-American pressure to normalize its relations with Germany. France abandoned its European security architecture, lost its credibility in Central Europe and consequently abdicated its great power status. We know where this led us – collectively. The Anglo-Saxon mistake of wanting to maintain good relations with Germany at the expense of France will thus have poisoned continental Europe for more than a century.
France’s policy in Central Europe
The configuration of the map of Europe in the aftermath of World War II caused France (as well as De Gaulle) to lose sight of both the German problem, which could then be considered solved, as well as the Polish alliance, which could be considered impossible (especially since part of the Polish elite had been decimated by the joint efforts of the Nazis and the Soviets, including 23,000 officers exterminated at Katyń by the latter). With Germany cut in two and occupied, Poland in the hands of Moscow, and France caught in the confrontation of two blocs, Central Europe largely razed by the Second World War disappeared from the French geopolitical chessboard.
In this context, the desire for “independence” vis-à-vis the United States took precedence over all other geostrategic concerns of France and could lead it to soften its relations with the USSR. This is what led the general to speak of an “American protectorate installed in Europe under the cover of NATO” and to leave the integrated command of NATO in 1966, declaring that “France’s will to dispose of itself is incompatible with a defense organization in which it is subordinate.
While solidly committed to the United States, France developed an anti-American sensibility, reinforced not only by the humiliation of the Suez crisis and its colonial interests, but also by the power of the French Communist Party. The United States did not find favor with any of the French political parties during the Cold War, and from the 1980s onwards, France’s general rejection of Anglo-Saxon neo-liberal policies was added to this.
France had and still has difficulty in detaching itself from the conception of Russia as a counterweight to the United States, clinging to what it takes to be sacrosanct Gaullism, whereas it was merely a variation on the theme of the politics of grandeur.
France’s anti-American sentiments remain strong. Among the causes of this situation are the following:
- France sees neo-liberalism as a threat to its paternalistic economic model, which is further exacerbated by the aggressive tax optimization of U.S. firms that pay taxes in Ireland on profits made in the rest of the common market (which accounts for about 70 percent of those profits).
- France’s pro-Arab policy. The best example of this was provided by Dominique de Villepin’s speech to the UN Security Council in 2003 and France’s refusal to participate in the Iraq war.
- The error of analysis that is fashionable in France and which consists in thinking that the United States is permanently weakened in a world that has become “multipolar”, a product of the Primakov doctrine, established during the Franco-Russian convergence of the late 1990s. Our world is indeed multi-polar, but one pole dominates. To think that there is some kind of equality of power between the United States, the European Union and China is a mistake, especially when one forgets the international liberal order. This mistake has led Emmanuel Macron, in the line of his predecessors, to define France as “a balancing power in the service of peace and security” and to run it as a kind of diplomatic bank. This is hardly a good slogan for selling arms on the other side of the planet, but as a summary of a strategy, it leaves one doubtful.
- Occasional but recurring diplomatic crises such as the termination in October 2021 by Australia of the submarine delivery contract it had signed with France in 2016 for 56 billion euros, in favour of a new American-English contract.
- In line with its foreign policy during the Cold War, France is wary of an openly pro-American Central Europe. The participation of Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Latvia and Estonia in the Iraq war was very badly viewed by Paris. The fact that these countries buy most of their military equipment from the United States is a constant cause of France’s irritation towards them. However, it is important to understand that the European structural funds are not a handout and that the common market benefits France as much as it benefits the Central European nations. Poland does not compete with France in any way in the high-tech sectors, French investments generate juicy dividends, and Polish electronic components are worth more than those from China.
- France’s difficulties to internationalize, to adapt to the fluidity of the Anglo-Saxon world, to influence global governance and to participate in the definition of international standards.
The other reasons that may favor Russia in France are mainly corruption and the influence of Russia. For how is it that a former French Prime Minister can sit on the board of directors of a Russian company? In addition, Russia has, for example, apart from associations such as Dialogue Franco-Russe directed by the deputy Thierry Mariani, two media in France: Russia Today and Sputnik News.
As for the economic relations between France and Russia, they are laughable compared to those that France has with Central Europe and are in no way an argument for maintaining good relations with Russia. For example, the total value (goods and services) of trade flows between France and Central Europe (Poland, Romania, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Croatia, Estonia and Latvia) reached $80 billion in 2019, while that between France and Russia was only $16 billion. To extend the comparison, the value of trade with Italy, France’s second largest trading partner after Germany (173 billion), was 91 billion, with the United States 90 billion, with China 83 billion, with Spain 82 billion and with the United Kingdom 63 billion … Even with regard to gas, France imports only about 20% of its gas from Russia and can substitute it without any difficulty. The condescension of the Élysée Palace towards Central Europe, compared to its determination to improve relations with Russia, seems all the more absurd.
Moreover, France’s very modest presence on NATO’s eastern flank is incomprehensible in comparison with its efforts in Africa. Two figures suffice to convince us: Operation Barkhane cost France more than a billion dollars in 2020, while the total value of its trade with the African countries where it was militarily present amounted to nearly 7 billion dollars (including 4.5 billion in exports). What can justify such a disproportion? Difficulty in updating its geostrategic thinking and breaking with a certain way of conceiving the world.
The policy of considering Russia as a partner is in any case a failure. Since 2013 France has been gradually undoing all its ties with Russia, but unfortunately under duress and astonishment, not on its own strategic initiative. This while neglecting contact with Central Europe and never consulting Central European governments before negotiating with Russia. France thus has bad relations with both Russia and Poland. Emmanuel Macron received Valdimir Putin in Versailles only three weeks after his election and only met Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki for the first time for a bilateral meeting eight months later, in a basement of the European Parliament. To make matters worse, calling Morawiecki an anti-Semite (despite his Jewish origins) raises questions about President Macron’s ability to formulate geopolitical reasoning that is at least as logical as that of Donald Trump. This is all the more true if he declares at the same time that Vladimir Putin “is not a dictator” and that “insulting him” would not advance the negotiations…
Emmanuel Macron had wanted a “Europe-power” “from Lisbon to Vladivostok”, “strategically autonomous”, without taking into account the security issues of Central Europe. We see today where this has led him – and Europe.
Reorienting France’s foreign policy
Strengthening its ties with Central Europe would allow France to obtain a useful counterweight to Germany and to strengthen its position vis-à-vis the United States, because the latter needs France to:
- support sanctions against Russia and help Ukraine win the war
- support European security more within the framework of NATO, and not in the perspective of aberrant conceptions such as a strategic autonomy from Lisbon to Vladivostok…
- support their fight against China in Europe, in the face of a reluctant Germany
- contain in a general way the harmful influence of German mercantilism on world trade
Without a strong commitment from France, the US will only succeed at arm’s length; without any commitment from France, it will not succeed. The United States also needs a Europe that works without a strong commitment from the United States, which is the key to its strategic reorientation towards Asia.
Either France will establish itself as a reliable and respected partner of the United States, or it will expose itself to increasing isolation on the international stage, and expose the entire West to the Chinese threat. By pretending to do everyone’s interests in order to do one’s own, one ends up doing the interests of one’s opponents.
French policy in Central Europe is all the more aberrant in that there is a sort of disconnect between the behavior of the French political class with regard to Central Europe and the attitude of French companies towards the region. The United States has grasped the political interest of Central Europe very well, despite relatively little investment and a relatively modest economic presence. France’s negative political alignment prevents it from taking advantage of its economic presence. For example, the cumulative value of French FDI in Poland reached 5 billion euros in 2020, just behind German FDI (7.5 billion).
Central Europe could, however, provide France with the contracts it needs to revive its economy; it is the reservoir of growth it is missing. The potential is considerable: arms contracts, energy contracts (nuclear), aeronautical orders, infrastructure… All of France’s cutting-edge products and services can contribute to the development of Central Europe, because it needs France, and all the more so because it needs to gain its economic independence from German production chains.
The region, with a population of 150 million, has experienced unprecedented development over the past 30 years and has enormous potential, but still faces many structural difficulties. These difficulties will be overcome without France if the latter does not react. Central Europe has an infrastructure deficit of about 1.5 trillion dollars. It is incomprehensible that France, unlike Germany and the United States, has not decided to participate in the Three Seas Initiative, designed to transform the region.
The progress that has been made in terms of know-how, skills, and organization over the past 30 years is considerable, but the remaining potential is just as great. Central Europe still has much to learn from France. One only has to look at the Polish accounting books to see this. They are often disorganized; the result is a myriad of small companies, with difficulties in bringing out larger structures.
Conclusion
France’s best ally was never Russia, Germany or England (nor the latter’s annexes), but Poland. This is a historical fact.
France has the choice between :
- continue to conceive of itself as a world power without a true European anchor, fall into insignificance and be the laughing stock of the international diplomatic scene
- become a strong and respected regional power, which it is only half of at present
Containing what lies between the Rhine and the Sudetenland has been the priority of French foreign policy for almost 1000 years. France’s power in the world is first and foremost its power in Europe. France was only strong when Poland was strong, and Poland’s eclipse was a disaster for France. In recent times, France’s policy towards Russia has in fact been that of Germany. If we do not wake up and put France’s interests where they belong, i.e. in Paris and not in Berlin or Moscow, the French people will reshuffle the cards in their own (not necessarily the best) way: 60% of the French voted for anti-European political parties in the last presidential elections, in addition to the fact that Emmanuel Macron did not get a majority to lead the country. Let’s remember that the Lisbon Treaty was a way to force the French to accept the European constitution they had rejected. A strange idea. Besides, what seems to be an inexorable loss of control of the French political and economic elite over their country is perhaps the most obvious symptom of their difficulties in updating their strategic thinking.
Daniel Nicolas Foubert
Born into a four-generation Franco-Polish family, geo-economist and founder of the Warsaw-based international business consulting firm Excalibur Insight. He works to develop political and economic ties between France and Central Europe. He started as a Business Developer for Europe in the French fintech Lemon Way, and then worked as a Merger & Acquisition Analyst for Suez Poland and Mazars Poland, where he participated in the due diligence carried out by Accor during the sale of its stake in Orbis for €1.06bn. He holds a Master’s degree in Finance from Neoma Business School as well as a Master’s degree in International Relations and a Bachelor’s degree in History from Paris-Sorbonne University.